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KNOWING WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF CREATION
Henk G. Geertsema

How should belief in creation affect our theoretical understanding of knowl
edge? In this essay I argue that traditional views of knowledge, illustrated
by Plato and Descartes, cannot do justice to the integral meaning of reality
as God's creation. Making use of two metaphors, the visual metaphor for
theoretical knowledge and the biblical one of hearing the divine promisecommand to be, I sketch the outlines of a theoretical framework that takes
belief in creation as its starting point. My approach is based upon insights of
Reformational philosophy and leads to a view in which beliefs and proposi
tions concerning isolated states of affairs are replaced by an emphasis on the
concrete situations in which knowing occurs. Important notions like rational
ity and objectivity lose their central place to responsibility and acknowledge
ment. I claim that in this way the biblical understanding of reality as God's
creation can be better appreciated than in approaches that take their starting
point in Greek and modern philosophical conceptions.

I. Introduction
When in everyday life we claim to know, we usually have something
or someone concrete in mind.1 We know John Brown or we do not. We
know New York or we do not. We know the way to Amsterdam or we
do not. We know when the Berlin wall was broken down or we do not.
The last example might easily figure in a theoretical discussion too, the
others less likely so. The reason for this is that epistemology is usually
concerned with beliefs and their content in terms of propositions. And,
although the knowledge claimed in the first three examples does imply
beliefs and propositions, it is too encompassing and vague to be expressed
by a specific and limited number of them. In theory we like our examples
to be clear and well defined. The content of the beliefs discussed, there
fore, needs to be simple and, most of the time, represents isolated states
of affairs.
In this essay I will look at knowing and knowledge from the perspec
tive of the biblical view of creation. In doing so I will make a double cir
cuit. The first round will start with a brief outline of the biblical belief
in creation. I will then offer a provisional description of two important
tendencies in epistemological thought, taking my cue from Plato's cave
parable and Descartes's doubt experiment, and show, in a few essential
matters, where tensions with the belief in creation occur. The second
round will try to develop a different theoretical perspective on knowledge
against the background of the biblical belief in creation and by means of
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the structural theory of Reformational philosophy.2 To bring out its dis
tinctive character, I will contrast this approach with the views discussed
before. Though I will argue that knowledge must do justice to its object,
I make no such pretension with regard to my discussion of Plato and
Descartes. Their views are discussed only in order to reveal certain fun
damental tendencies in thought on knowledge which, I believe, are still
relevant today.
The focus of the discussion will be on the conception of knowledge. But
the view of reality as such cannot be ignored. Epistemology and ontology
will prove to be intimately connected. It will appear that Reformational
philosophy is closer to the everyday understanding of knowledge than
epistemology is accustomed to be. The view of knowledge in terms of
beliefs and propositions concerning isolated states of affairs will be re
placed by an approach which emphasizes knowledge in the context of
concrete relationships. Instead of taking knowledge in a universal sense,
a diversity of knowing situations, each with its own kind of normativity,
will be explored. Important notions like rationality and objectivity will
lose their central place to responsibility and acknowledgement. It is my
contention that in this way the biblical understanding of reality as God's
creation can be better appreciated than in those approaches that take their
starting point in Greek and modern philosophical conceptions.
II. An Outline o f Two Traditions and their Contrast with the Notion of Creation
2.1 The Biblical Belief in Creation and its Relevance to Human Knowledge
Heidegger once said that the Christian belief in creation offers too easy an
answer to the question of reality's true nature.3 The answer: everything is
created by God! is given before the weight of the question has been able to
sink in. It is in fact true that the belief in creation is in a certain sense prior
to any inquiry into reality. It is itself not a result of study. But we should
equally emphasize that, correctly understood, it is far from an easy answer.
To say that reality is God-created is to refer to a deep, unfathomable mys
tery. We may enter this mystery, but it does not become transparent to us.
This is strikingly formulated in Psalm 139. The poet expresses there how he
cannot comprehend the knowledge which God as his Maker has of him.
O Lord, thou has searched me and known me . . .
Such knowledge is too wonderful for me;
it is high, I cannot attain it.4
The enduring mystery of creation is also indicated by the multitude of
expressions which the story of the creation in Genesis requires to describe
the creation. I want to look briefly at two of these: creating as making and
creating as commanding.
2.1.1 Creating as Making
And God said, "Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters,
and let it separate the waters from the waters . . . . " And God made
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the great two lights, the greater light to rule the day, and the lesser
light to rule the night; he made the stars also. . . . And God made the
beasts of the earth according to their kinds and the cattle according
to their kinds. . . . And God saw that it was good. . . . Then God said,
"Let us make man . . . ."5
These images present God as a craftsman or artist who carefully and lov
ingly creates a work of art and enjoys it. The result reveals his wisdom,
skill, power. The small details—the fine tissue of butterfly wings, neuro
physiological processes—bespeak his great care, the immense energy in
the universe which contracts and expands in the birth and death of stars
bespeaks his unimaginable power.
Two comments are required straightaway. (1) The examples given make
it clear that belief in creation stimulates rather than hampers the study of
reality, as is in fact shown by the development of natural science in the
sixteenth century and later. We should put it even more strongly. Someone
in a museum who looks at a work of art that he does not understand, and
then reads the name of an artist unfamiliar to him, does not profit much
from the knowledge that this particular name is connected to this work
of art. It remains meaningless. Real knowledge grows only when insight
into the work of art is gained and the person behind the name takes on an
identity. The same goes for God's creation. Precisely as creation, reality
calls for careful inquiry against the background of the Name by which
God revealed himself. This brings me to my second, related comment.
(2) A tension becomes readily visible between the investigation of real
ity and the Name by which God is known. The Name of God in the Bible is
expressive of goodness and mercy. This is personified in Jesus Christ as he
is characterized in the New Testament. The reality of nature and history is
full of cruelty. How can the Name of the Creator be bound up with this?
At the very least we have to say that the creation has not remained whole.
The work of art is full of cracks. Through the cracks we can still discern the
original lines. But sometimes it becomes difficult, if not impossible. It is
clear that reality cannot be simply labelled 'creation of God.' The connec
tion of God's Name, as it is confessed in the Christian faith, with existing
reality therefore remains a matter of faith. The creation as mystery does
not become transparent by itself. The disruption and degeneration as a
result of evil threatens to make it an insoluble riddle. Yet the mystery re
mains accessible. Faith in the revealed Name begins to recognize contours
of the creation's intention, though many pressing questions remain.
2.1.2 Creating as Commanding
And God said, "Let there be light"; and there was light. . . . And God
said, "Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters . . . ." And it
was so. . . . And God said, "Let the waters under the heavens be gath
ered together in one place
" And it was so. And God said, "Let there
be lights in the firmament . . . ." And it was so. And God said . . . .6
The most characteristic feature of the creation story in Genesis is the recur
rent phrase 'and God said,' followed by the creative command itself and
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the realization of what is called into being.7 Psalm 33 expresses the same
idea succinctly as:
For he spoke, and it came to be;
he commanded, and it stood forth.8
The absolute dependence of the created on the Creator is expressed here
in two ways. The image of the craftsman or artist already brings out the
Maker's close bond with his work. Great care and attention is lavished on
the detail. There is an intimate presence of the sculptor in the sculpture via
his fingers which mould the plaster or via the chisel and hammer which
tool the stone and wood. Creating by calling into being adds another di
mension. No longer is there a given material which offers opportunities
but also imposes limits on what the artist can do. The creation takes place
from inside, as it were. The word calls into being 'out of nothing' and thus
the creature becomes real.
A second element is related to this. Creating as making suggests a cer
tain independence of the result vis-a-vis the Creator. When the work of
art is finished, it has its own existence independent of the maker. Creating
as a command to exist implies a lasting dependence. The execution of a
command remains geared to the command itself. Detachment from the
command results in disobedience. Conversely, if the command is with
drawn, the execution loses its foundation. Command and execution are
dynamically involved in an asymmetrical relationship of dependence.
But the creation is not just about dependence. 'And God saw that it
was good.' The result of creation is more than a neutral, factual beingthere. Anybody who knows anything about the Creator would not have
expected otherwise. The quality of the work of art is guaranteed by who
the artist is. This also applies to the command in relation to who gives
it. But in this respect, too, the relationship is even more intimate. Execu
tion and command are geared to each other. Obeying a good command
leads to something good. A bad command leads to evil. In this way the
command to exist determines intrinsically the quality of that which ex
ists. Because of the goodness of the Creator creating as commanding can
therefore be characterized as a promise-command to exist. Creating is a
normative notion. And this brings us back to the tension mentioned in
connection with creating as making: the opacity of that which exists as
creation. The promise does not seem to have been fulfilled. At the very
least there is a tension between the purport of the command and the way
it is executed. A proper understanding of creating as commanding cannot
ignore evil either. Reality does not live up to the high expectations we
may justly have.9Knowledge of the Creator cannot only be acquired from
what exists.
2.1.3 The Significance for Human Knowledge
In the Christian tradition, gaining knowledge of reality has often been
compared with reading a book. God is seen as the Author of a text. People
can try to read it. The metaphor of a book is sometimes used both for
the creation and for its development in history, sometimes specifically
for nature, which gives the wrong impression that creation is confined to
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nature. For an understanding of reality as creation, though, it is a good
metaphor. It shows that reality as creation is full of intrinsic meaning and
that it refers to the Creator. Both elements should set the tone for the way
human knowledge deals with reality. The metaphor of the text with its
author, for all that it is a new image, is a natural sequel to the notions
of creating as making and creating as commanding. Creational relation
ship implies the qualitative meaning of the created. And knowledge here
should lead to acknowledgement. Yet time and again we find that the text
has not remained whole. Hence it is sometimes hard to understand and
the text sometimes seems at odds with the character of the Author. This,
too, should be considered when we read.
Human knowing brings us to our own position in reality as creation.
Genesis 1 talks about this too. Humankind forms an integral part of cre
ation. But our distinctive place is emphasized too:
And God said, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness;
and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the
birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over
every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth." So God created
man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and
female he created them.10
The position of power awarded to us over our fellow creatures is certainly
not unlimited. The governing norm is indicated by the recurrent motif
'And God saw that it was good.' The Creator's intention for his creation
must also be brought out in humankind's stewardship over it. This means
that justice is done to the distinctive nature of all creatures.
Humankind's distinctive position and the norm governing it are well
expressed in the story of Genesis 2 about Adam's naming of the animals.
As he names them, so they will be called. But it is also clear that the names
are not given at random. Names name and are consequently more than
a numeric code. Language must put into words the meaning of reality.
Knowledge of and conduct towards our fellow creatures come together
here. The starting-point for both is always the 'fear of the Lord.'
Gen. 1 mainly develops the idea of our uniqueness in relation to our
non-human fellow creatures. To gain a broader perspective on the mean
ing of the expression 'image of God,' we should juxtapose Genesis 1 with
Jesus' answer to the question of the great commandment:
"You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all
your soul, and with all your mind. This is the great and first com
mandment. And a second is like it, You shall love your neighbour as
yourself. On these two commandments depend all the law and the
prophets."11
Jesus' words indicate our purpose in life. We are made with this intention.
In other words, Jesus indicates the fundamental framework for the acqui
sition of self-knowledge, which should characterize all our knowledge,
indeed our entire existence, since our self-understanding is expressed in
our entire existence. Jesus' words indicate that our self-understanding is
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determined by our position towards God and our neighbour. The love
commandment points out how these relations are fulfilled, and thus how
the Maker's intention with his image becomes visible. If we look at the
words of the great commandment against the background of creating as
promise-command to exist, its meaning for human self-understanding
and knowing in general is brought out even more clearly. The promisecommand to exist as a creative word to humankind means that two basic
elements characterize our existence: responsibility and calling as an an
swer to the command component and desire and expectation as a response
to the promise component. Both constitute our existence as human. They
typify the way we exist. And this also applies to our knowledge and con
duct towards our fellow creatures in all the relations in which we exist.
These involve responsibility and expectation, response and desire, because
we exist in God's creation. The love commandment indicates how calling
and desire can be fulfilled on our part. It also shows how our actual exis
tence has become alienated, both from the command and the promise, and
from their fulfilment.
2.2 The Rationality M otif in Greek Philosophy and Plato's Parable of the Cave
In the world of knowledge, the last thing to be perceived and only
with great difficulty is the essential Form of Goodness. Once it is
perceived, the conclusion must follow that, for all things, this is the
cause of whatever is right and good; in the visible world it gives
birth to light and to the lord of light, while it is itself sovereign in the
intelligible world and the parent of intelligence and truth. Without
having had a vision of this Form no one can act with wisdom, either
in his own life or in matters of state.12
These words of Plato in the seventh book of The Republic form a central
statement in his discussion of justice. They are designed to show that just
action in politics depends on orientation to the idea of the good. They are
part of his explanation of the cave parable and should therefore be under
stood against the background of the human condition which it portrays.
People can be compared to prisoners in an underground prison. They
are chained in such a way that they cannot move from their position or
even move their head from left to right. They can only look straight ahead.
High behind them burns a great fire. Its light throws shadows on the wall
in front of them, shadows of objects and images which are carried past
behind them. The shadows of the carriers themselves are invisible. For
the prisoners are seated with their back against a wall and only the car
ried objects rise above it. The voices of the people can be heard, but only
via echoes against the wall in front of the prisoners, so that the shadows
themselves seem to speak.
This is what reality looks like to the prisoners. As far as they know, this
is reality: shadows of images of real objects, animals and people. Only
when prisoners are freed and led from the darkness of the cave to the light
of the sun do they come to see reality as it truly is. But it takes time and
effort before the eyes get used to this reality. Only at the very end can they
be raised to the sun, to the light to which all reality owes its visibility. From
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the perspective of the cave-dwellers this reality is unimaginable. When
the prisoners return, their story is not believed, the more so because their
eyes, now used to daylight, can no longer make out the shadows on the
cave wall.
Plato's parable is an allegory of human knowledge. We are no better off
than the prisoners in the cave. Our everyday reality is nothing but shad
ows of images of real things. Philosophers who have seen the truth could
disabuse us. But they are ridiculed. As a result, we are shut off from real
insight and the possibility of acting wisely. The idea of the Good eludes us.
Someone who refuses to follow the path to real knowledge or, unable to
do so himself, refuses to listen to those who have gained true insight, has
not only limited his scope to 'believing' instead of 'knowing,' he has also
cut off the road to correct action.
At first sight it is not surprising that Christians later felt attracted to these
views of Plato. Didn't they, too, believe in the need to be saved from a
sinful existence alienated from God? Didn't Plato's idea of the Good refer
to God himself, who is also called the Light of the world and on whom
everything depends? For Plato, the Idea was not 'just an idea,' but the
highest reality. Christians did, of course, recognize that evil in human be
ings is not only a matter of ignorance or stupidity, but that their will plays
an important part too. But this addition was not a real obstacle to adoption
of Plato's ideas.
Yet this connection between Christian faith and elements of Greek phi
losophy puts pressure on essential elements of biblical faith. For Plato,
intellectual thought is the prime entranceway to knowledge of reality.13
Consequently, this thought becomes the criterion for what true reality is
assumed to be. That is why Plato sees the world of ideas as more real
than concretely experienced everyday reality. It is the reality in which
people live and to which they therefore must always return, but it is also
the world from which they must be freed if their humanity is to achieve
its true goal.
There are at least two points on which this view conflicts with the bibli
cal belief in creation. (1) Reality is divided into higher and lower. This
emerges very clearly in Plato's theory of the human soul. He distinguishes
three parts here: the appetitive, the spirited, and mind. The first is the
source of evil according to Plato. In his mind, man is akin to the gods and
like these has access to the reality of the ideas, unless he is prevented by
sensual desire. Thus mind is set against the senses, the intellectual against
the material. The created itself displays a tension between higher and
lower. Corporeality is in danger of being undervalued. The origin of evil is
located somewhere in creation. This violates the integral character of cre
ation as expressed in the Bible. Everything is no longer good 'by nature,'
as created. The distance to the Idea of the Good, supreme being, becomes
determinative. What is farther away from supreme being becomes more
characterised by non-being. Creation thus becomes a connection of being
and non-being. As such it is seen to be defective.
(2) The second point is directly connected with the defective being of
the created. The being by which all that exists is measured has an abso
lute character. It is divine in nature. In other words, the criterion for the
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created is no longer itself creatural, so that it can be judged according
to its nature. Divine being is taken as criterion for the created. This is
borne out by Plato's theory of knowledge. Though Plato emphasizes that
people are distinct from the gods precisely in the nature of their cognition—the gods have absolute knowledge, people can only aspire to it
(philo-sophy)-yet precisely this shows that the knowledge of the gods
is seen to be the ideal of knowledge. It becomes the standard by which
human knowledge is judged. Absolute knowledge of an absolute reality
therefore becomes the ideal. The finiteness of both knowledge and reality
implied in createdness is thus misunderstood in its positive nature ('And
God saw that it was good').
2.3 The Subject-object Scheme of Modern Philosophy and Descartes's
Doubt Experiment
For a long time I had remarked that it is sometimes requisite in com
mon life to follow opinions which one knows to be most uncertain,
exactly as though they were indisputable___But because in this case
I wished to give myself entirely to the search after Truth, I thought
that it was necessary for me to take an apparently opposite course,
and to reject as absolutely false everything as to which I could imag
ine the least ground of doubt, in order to see if afterwards there re
mained anything in my belief that was entirely certain.14
Rene Descartes (1596-1650) is mainly known for his methodological doubt:
by systematically trying out how far his doubt can go, he wants to find an
absolutely certain starting-point from which the edifice of knowledge can
be rebuilt. His doubt mainly concerns three points. The senses sometimes
deceive us and so Descartes assumes for a moment that the senses delude
us in all cases. Arguments are prone to error and so Descartes rejects for
a moment all arguments which he had previously considered valid. We
have all kinds of images both when we dream and when we are awake.
Descartes therefore assumes for a moment that all his images have no
more reality than when they occur in his dreams. And then he realizes
that 'from the very fact that I thought of doubting the truth of other things,
it very evidently and certainly followed that I was.'15 To his mind he has
thus found the starting-point for his philosophy, or to be more precise, for
knowledge of the truth.
A striking feature of the above quotation is that Descartes does not
connect the search for certain truth with action. Action, says Descartes,
is often based on something uncertain, even though it is necessary to
assume absolute certainty. We might conclude that Descartes's doubt
experiment is not concerned with action at all. This would be a wrong
conclusion, as we can see from a different place. In the second part of his
account Descartes mentions a number of examples in which it is attrac
tive but actually unfeasible to demolish an existing structure and rebuild
it: a city which has been built in the course of time by different architects,
so that it makes a disorderly impression; or a lawbook to which new
laws have gradually been added, so that its original coherence is lost.
And he continues:
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But as regards all the opinions which up to this time I had embraced,
I thought I could not do better than endeavour once for all to sweep
them completely away, so that they might later on be replaced, either
by others which were better, or by the same, when I had made them
conform to the uniformity of a rational scheme. And I firmly believed
that by this means I should succeed in directing my life much better
than if I had only built on old foundations, and relied on principles
of which I allowed myself to be in youth persuaded without having
inquired into their truth.16
This quotation shows that Descartes's demolition-reconstruction experi
ment also serves practical purposes, even though he subjects it to all kinds
of restrictions. He is clearly concerned with a ideal of knowledge for sci
ence, but he also envisages practical results allowing application of the
acquired knowledge. The consequences of his project therefore do not
remain purely academic. Because the method for the reconstruction of
knowledge is derived from mathematics and so links up with the math
ematical method of natural science, its practical application deeply affects
the nature of reality. In this sense Descartes's enterprise is totally revolu
tionary: the old must be demolished and built up from scratch. This does
not take place directly but only via the way in which action takes shape
and direction—but the effects are no less radical. The traditional basis of
action in acquired convictions and views is replaced (where possible) with
scientific analyses and reconstructions by means of natural science.
The consequences of this revolution are radical, because after the de
molition-reconstruction procedure all extra-conscious reality is seen as
something that can be understood and controlled by means of the math
ematical-scientific method. It is not deemed to have any other quality than
that which can be represented by mathematical means. In practice this
means that it is seen as being without qualities. It is nothing but material
that as such does not yet possess meaning. Its nature can be computed
and then manipulated in such a way that it becomes serviceable to chosen
ends. This gives rise to the idea of an objective reality without intrinsic
value, without inherent normative limits to how it is dealt with. Meaning
and significance can only be derived from the human subject. The result is
a sharp distinction of values and norms on the one hand and facts on the
other. Facts are objective, values and norms belong to the subject.
The first consequence of the Cartesian revolution has mainly to do with
the method chosen for reconstruction: mathematical-scientific thought. But
the way Descartes believed he could reach a certain starting-point had pro
found consequences too. The turn to the subject in the doubt experiment
means that human consciousness is placed in opposition to reality. 'I think,
therefore I am' was the point where Descartes ended up. This could not be
doubted. The great problem was: how do you get away from there?
Descartes finds his starting-point in consciousness. This may provide a
starting-point for certain knowledge, but not yet certainty of the knowl
edge itself. The doubt experiment can be set up in a different way too. If
I look out of the window, I see trees, houses and cars. Now I can imagine
that I am dreaming. For sometimes I see the same things in my dreams.
So I can wonder whether reality corresponds to my images. But there is
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no point in wondering whether I really have the images which I see. The
images are immediately certain in my consciousness. I cannot meaning
fully doubt them. The question is whether there is something outside of
my consciousness that corresponds to these images.
Precisely because Descartes's doubt experiment withdraws to the un
assailable certainty of the individual consciousness, the outside world
becomes a problem. And this problem is not really solved by the math
ematical-scientific method. Though it can point to great successes, sci
entific knowledge, in Descartes's thought, remains mind-constructed
knowledge. The method is a method of the mind or consciousness. And
so the question remains whether and how reality corresponds to it. The
question of certainty of knowledge with its answer in the undeniable fact
of consciousness and the reliability of scientific method means that the
character of knowledge as true to reality remains problematical.17
Certainly Descartes did not intend to cast doubt on the Christian faith.
Indeed, faith in God plays an indispensable role in reconstructing the
edifice of knowledge. The fact that an immediately evident insight can
be trusted depends on the truthfulness of God, who does not deceive us,
says Descartes. Yet it is clear that his revolution in thought clashes with
the biblical belief in creation. This is easy to see if we look at the two con
sequences mentioned.
If reality is viewed extra-consciously as material without intrinsic quality,
it can hardly still be seen as a work of art that expresses the greatness of its
creator. Once again the metaphor of the text can help to clarify the meaning
of the separation between norms and values on the one hand and facts on
the other. Subject-object thinking forces us to view the text as a fortuitous
result, e.g., of a word-processor operated by a monkey. The print-out can
be tested for all kinds of regularities: the nature of letter combinations, fre
quency of letters, etc. Everything can be computed. We can even make pre
dictions. But the 'text' does not have meaning. Someone who says: 'what a
beautiful poem!' has given it a meaning which is not intrinsically present
on paper. There is no author. The text produced in this way is not based on
meaning-giving intentionality. If we consider extra-conscious reality to be
without intrinsic meaning, and therefore without intrinsic limits to what
may be done with it, we leave its Creator out of the picture.
The same applies to the starting-point in consciousness. The connec
tion between humankind and the reality surrounding him, a connection
implied in creation, cannot be ignored without detracting from createdness itself. The creation comprehends humankind and world. And the
latter cannot be constructed on the basis of the former. Any such attempt
must somehow put the human subject in the place of the Creator. In fact
the very search for absolute certainty goes against a recognition of our
creatureliness. It is an attempt to transcend the vulnerable finiteness of the
human condition by refusing to be satisfied with the creatural possibilities
and aspiring to a 'God's-eye point of view.'
III. Knowledge and Rationality: Two Metaphors
The striking thing about Plato's cave parable is that, to explain what he
means by true knowledge, he uses the metaphor of seeing—but sensory
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cognition is precisely what he wants to move away from. Its orientation,
he says, is to the shadows of images of true reality. Only the mind or the
intellectual part of the soul is able to know the true reality of the ideas. Not
the senses but thought gives access to truth. Yet he uses a visual metaphor
for this. Mind is interpreted as an ability to 'see.' We can compare the
word 'insight.' The word 'theory' originally has this background too, with
the meaning 'to see intellectually.' If we examine the history of Western
thought, we find that the metaphor of seeing has strongly shaped the con
ception of intellectual cognition.
In modern times the visual metaphor has retreated into the background
somewhat. It has gradually been overtaken by the idea of 'rationality.' This
idea is more concerned with the arguments that can be given for a par
ticular view. Argumentation itself becomes determinative. Method takes
prime position. Yet the goal continues to be (theoretical) insight. Indeed,
as Descartes's discourse on method shows, insight is indispensable at the
beginning and at every stage of argumentation, at any rate if it is to lead to
valid knowledge. So there remains a connection between the modern idea
of rationality and Plato's visual metaphor. Hence we use 'rationality' here
to describe this entire way of thinking that goes back to Plato.
An entirely different metaphor functions in the biblical creation belief.
If creation can be expounded in terms of a promise-command to exist, the
created can be interpreted as an answer to this. The metaphor here refers
less to knowing than to reality itself. But just as the visual metaphor for
knowing has consequences in Plato for the conception of reality, so the
answering or hearing metaphor for created reality must have implications
for the way that knowing is understood.
The rest of this essay will take these two metaphors as its starting-point.
First the metaphor of seeing will be used to say more about the concep
tion of reality implied in the view of knowing that comes with the idea
of rationality. Then the metaphor of hearing will be used to explore the
understanding of reality based on the belief in creation, in order to outline
the distinctive character of the related view of knowledge.
3.1 Rationality and the Metaphor of Seeing
It is easy to recognize why Plato chose the metaphor of seeing to explain
what he wanted to say. After all, everybody who can use their eyes knows
about shadows, images, reflections, and real things. In this way Plato en
listed visual reality to illustrate distinctions for which metaphors derived
from (sensory) hearing would be inadequate. We could point to the echo
which we sometimes hear. But this, too, involves real sounds which are
governed by the same laws as the sound which produces the echo. This
does not apply to shadow images created when objects are placed in a
strong light. This metaphor can illustrate the existence of various degrees
of reality. But the visual metaphor has even more possibilities.
When we make a sketch of something we have seen, a special house
or a striking tree, we will, in most cases, not just indicate a number of
colours on paper, but first of all try to draw the form. The visible form of
things allows us to recognize them. Hence the world is experienced very
differently by those who cannot see. We identify things primarily by their
visual form.
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Clearly this is not the way Plato wants to go when he describes reality
in terms of ideas. True reality cannot be grasped by the senses. But Plato
does use the orientation of our seeing to form. The visual form becomes a
metaphor for what is visible to the mind's eye. It is not sketched by means
of lines and surfaces, but by concepts and definitions. Not the external
form which we apprehend with the sensory eye indicates the essence of
things, but the internal form which we see with the eye of the intellect. Not
the drawing shows what things are, but the concept of which words (or
nowadays formulas) form the best expression.
Plato's turn from the senses to the mind thus involves a radical change
in the concept of form as the mark of thing identity. His entire view of real
ity is bound up with this. Three points in particular are important here.
(1) The forms we see with our eyes are all subject to change. Some forms
change rapidly, like smoke coming out of a chimney. Others change more
gradually, like trees that grow: at first relatively fast, later very slowly.
Some forms seem constant through the centuries, like rocks made of hard
stone. But they too have a beginning and an end. For Plato, the forms seen
by the mind do not. Trees come into being and die, but the same cannot be
said of the concept 'tree.' What a tree is endures forever. Plato thus places
form as concept or idea outside of time. Insight into form means access to
an unchanging, eternal reality, a reality which therefore possesses greater
reality than the concretely experienced world of generation and death.
Hence knowledge of this reality can have an absolute character.
(2) Someone who focuses his attention on the form of a tree or a house
will mostly look at it without noticing the surroundings. We can also
look at the overall picture, even at the relations between various forms.
In general, though, concentration on form isolates the object from its en
vironment. This element returns in the focus on intellectually seen form,
certainly in Plato. A definition tries to see something in itself. This is what
Aristotle will later call the substance. Characteristically, the substance does
not need anything else for its existence. In this it differs from properties,
which occur only in things. A tree can be seen in itself. The colour brown
never occurs as such. It is always the colour of something.
Another, related element comes into play here. Concentrated percep
tion tends to objectify. This association is certainly implied in the word
'to observe.' When an object or even a person is observed, some kind of
distance takes place between the observer and his object. This does not
mean that the observer is not interested. He may watch with great absorp
tion, even admiration. Yet he looks at an 'object' as if it exists in itself, not
in a specific relation to him as observer. Or really it is the other way round.
Because seeing is not integrated in a specific relation, it is the perceptual
relation itself which bestows a certain character on seeing. As a result, the
object seems to be seen in itself. As if it exists as such.
The above descriptions try to make something clear about the self
subsistence of reality as implied in the Platonic metaphor of visual form.
The ideas are seen in their being-as-such. Herein lies the essence of things.
This does not mean that there are no relations between the ideas. There
certainly are. But these relations are abstract, not concrete. There is an
affinity between the ideas and the intellectual part of the soul. That is
why they can be known. There is an interrelation between the ideas, and
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certainly the relation to the One or the Good is important. But there is still
something of a world in itself whose being-as-such is determined by the
objectifying visual perspective. That is why only theoretical cognition can
do justice to this being.
(3)
Someone who takes sensory form as the starting-point for describing
something is usually aware that more can be said about it. This is certainly
true in the case of people. Reality is too complex and too rich to be ad
equately characterized in sensory terms. This no longer goes without say
ing for the 'form' which the mind sees. After all, the idea is that the concept
as 'form' indicates the essence of things. Of all 'things,' including human
reality. In this sense the world of ideas is homogenous or uniform. Every
thing essential can, in principle, be understood by thought on the basis
of the ideas. In Plato himself there remains a clear awareness of diversity,
precisely because reality as a whole does not coincide with the ideas. It is
determined in the nature of its being by its relation to the ideas. Reality is
stretched between the being of the ideas, or what transcends it, and non
being. After Plato this even leads to an elaborate hierarchy of being. If, as
in Descartes, it is assumed that reality can be reconstructed by means of
mathematical-scientific concepts, it becomes possible, in principle, to in
terpret reality as a system of concepts. This is in fact what happened. The
diversity of reality is reduced to an intellectual or rational system.
If in this way, on the basis of the metaphor of seeing for knowing, the
'form' which Plato saw in the ideas comes to determine his view of reality,
the latter in its turn is reflected in his view of knowing. The rational form
becomes the criterion for true cognition. It is this 'form' to which cognition
is orientated and which returns in cognition as the concept. The concept
as 'form' in cognition must reflect the form which constitutes the essence
of things, just as a sketch of a tree must represent its form in reality. In
the sensory form there can be no question of real identity, if only because
the drawing is a representation on a flat surface without the three-dimen
sional space of reality itself. This restriction does not apply to the form
which the mind sees, unless the concept is mistakenly identified with the
word by which it is expressed. Thought as such does not have this restric
tion. We have thus returned to the identity of thought and being posited
by Parmenides: truth becomes a correspondence between knowledge and
reality, not just in the sense that one corresponds to the other, but as iden
tity in form.18 Knowledge must be capable of expression in terms which
refer to self-subsistent being. And just as the being of the rational form is
far removed from concretely experienced reality, so true knowledge can
not be orientated to it either. The distinction between 'knowledge' and
'opinion' is thus made clear. The first applies to the rational reality of the
ideas, the second to the concrete reality of the senses. The first, if attained,
is unchanging and eternal, in short: absolute; the second is relative and
transitory. It is clear which of the two is to be preferred.
3.2 Normativity and the Metaphor of Hearing19
By talking about cognition and reality in metaphors of seeing, Plato can
easily distinguish between the true reality of the ideas and the shadowy
reality of ordinary phenomena. The ideas form the criterion by which the
phenomena are judged. And these are always found to be defective. The
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particular nature of the concrete phenomenon can never express the idea
in its generality. There is always a limitation. This tree is never 'the' tree
in its fullness. For this very reason the general idea has a greater reality
than the concrete phenomenon. In fact the relationship is one-sided. The
concrete phenomenon depends on the general idea. That is why it is what
it is, why this tree is 'tree.' But the dependence is not mutual. The concept
of tree does not rely on concrete trees.
The relation between the concrete and the general looks very different
when we examine it against the background of the metaphor of hearing
as it functions in creation belief. Creation can be seen here as a commandpromise to exist. The general element that can be heard in a command or a
promise is directly related to the concrete action by which it is carried out.
Examples may clarify this.
'The shop has to be evacuated at once. There has been a bomb alarm!'
This summons is addressed to everyone in the building who hears it, on
whatever floor or in whatever corner they happen to be. In this sense it
is a general command and everybody must do the same. But it is also
clear that if everybody acts or moves in the same way, evacuation of the
building will descend into chaos. How the general order is carried out
depends on the particular circumstances of the individual. The command
is directly related to these circumstances. Only in concrete circumstances
can a command be executed. These do not form a limitation, they are im
plied in the understanding and execution of the command.
'I will follow you wherever you go,' someone says to Jesus in the Gos
pel. Someone who makes such a promise cannot be sure of what he is
actually saying. He cannot know in advance where Jesus will go. Yet all
these possible situations are implied in his promise. The promise is gen
eral, but as such, as promise, it relates to all the relevant situations. Jesus'
answer is therefore a warning: 'Foxes have holes, and birds of the air have
nests; but the Son of man has nowhere to lay his head.' (Matt. 8:20)
A promise or command with general import is geared as command or
promise to the concrete situations which it covers. There is no question
of a dual reality as there is in the general as idea. Even though there is no
symmetrical relation, the general command and the concrete execution
are geared to each other, depend on each other. Applied to reality, the
norm for phenomena does not reside in an ideal reality which exists in
itself and of which they can only be a poor reflection. The norm lies in
the promise-command to be, which even as a general call is geared to the
particular phenomena and which can uniquely come into its own in every
phenomenon. The particular circumstances do not detract from the reality
of command and promise, they form an essential part of it.20
The metaphor of hearing in the sense of responding to a promise or
command implies a different view of reality compared with Plato's visual
metaphor.
(1)
Plato's conception of rational form allowed him to see true reality
as an eternal, unchanging world. The phenomena are in time. The ideas
to which they relate are not. If reality as a whole exists as an answer to
a word of creation, interpreted as a promise-command to be, its logical
place is to be integrally in time. After all, it takes time to carry out a com
mand or promise. Time is the trajectory along which being-as-answer is
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realized. The concrete existence in time is fully real. As such is does not
suffer from a deficiency of being, like the world of phenomena in Plato.
The criterion is not absolute form, but being-an-answer to the promisecommand to be.
Contrary to what Plato thought, it is not necessary to think the essence
of the tree by which it is tree, the idea or the concept, as being out of time.
The concept of a tree does not in fact perish with the tree itself. But this is
not to say that the concept itself is out of time. The concept which we form
of things clearly belongs to our temporary existence. True enough, it is
not bound up with particular individuals, it has constancy through time.
But it does not exist separately from temporary human existence. This
is also shown by the changes which concepts, too, undergo. Plato called
that which makes a tree a tree an idea, but it is better to call it a structure.
A structure also has a certain constancy, but there is no reason to see it as
raised above time. Rather it is a constant structure in time, and this con
stancy need not even exclude change.
The structure of a thing can be viewed as a complex of rules, as in the
game of chess. These rules apply to every game that can be called chess.
They determine its distinctive character and make this game the game of
chess. They also make it possible. Without rules no game as such can exist.
They can therefore be called constitutive. If we try to incorporate rules in
the metaphor of the promise-command to exist, we can say that the rules
are implied in the promise-command. It gives the rules for what exists as
answer to it. It gives structure. Even if the promise-command itself would
not be regarded as in time, this does not apply to the structure which
determines the phenomena in their own nature.
(2) Command and promise are as such geared to the circumstances in
which they obtain. Their execution is always connected with the particular
nature of the situation in which they take place. If we look at the existence
of things through the prism of this metaphor, they will not be seen in iso
lation from the relations in which they exist. Whereas the focus on form
tends to separate things from the concrete relationships in which they ex
ist, if existence is seen as an answer in a particular situation, the relations
in which things function must be coinvolved in the concept. 'Everything is
connected with everything': this also applies to the way things exist.
At the same time this metaphor can make it clear that things do not
primarily exist as objects of observation. It is not the perceptual relation
which determines the character of things, but their being-an-answer. Ev
erything that exists is an active subject in this sense. It may exist as such
and has a right to be acknowledged in its integral existence. Things exist
as an answer to the creative word. This characterizes their being-there, not
the fact that they can be seen as an object.21
(3) The metaphor of seeing, as used by Plato, awards an exclusive place
to rationality and mind. The sensory world has a second-rate status. The
view of existence as answer tries to do justice to the integral meaning of
things. All aspects are included, according to their nature, in the beingan-answer of things. Moreover, a diversity of aspects can be distinguished
which is much richer than that of sensation and mind. Even the physical
and the sensory cannot be reduced to each other. The entire diversity of
aspects analyzed in Reformational philosophy22 could be mentioned here.
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The special relation between thought and being no longer obtains. The
same applies to the exclusive connection of concrete experience with sen
sation. All aspects are part of the being of things and are involved in the
way they are experienced.
If reality is interpreted in this way as existing integrally in time, with a
great diversity of structures and relations, real precisely in its concreteness
and pervaded in all this by normativity, the conception of knowledge will
have to be different too. Four points in particular are important here.
(1) If the Platonic distinction between the true or ultimate reality of uni
versal ideas and the secondary world of concrete appearances loses its
validity, the nature of philosophical or scientific in contrast to everyday
knowledge needs reinterpretation. Its characterisation in terms of knowl
edge concerning what is essential or ultimate over against mere opinion
based upon subjective experience can no longer be maintained. Theoreti
cal knowledge has its advantages because it is based on method and welldefined concepts. At the same time, precisely for this reason, it is often
abstract and, therefore, farther away from integral reality than everyday
knowledge in practical situations.
(2) It is not rationality which determines the validity of knowledge, but
whether justice is done to things. In their own nature things ask to be
acknowledged. Because this is not determined by some or other rational
form, rationality cannot be the primary criterion for knowledge. All as
pects of experience should function according to their nature. The sensory
and the logical, but also for instance language and faith. The important
thing is to watch and listen closely, think and argue lucidly, choose the
right words to render the meaning of things and to have a sound perspec
tive in which all this receives its own place and the ultimate meaning of
reality can be understood. Only in this way can justice be done to integral
existence. Openness and precision are crucial.
(3) To know is to respond to the call for acknowledgement implied
in existence. But existence itself is not absolute. It is always determined
by concrete situations and circumstances. It is in relation. This returns in
knowledge. Different situations involve different criteria for knowledge,
precisely with a view to doing justice to things. A mother knows her child
differently from a doctor in a consultation room. A painter knows his paint
differently from an analyst in a laboratory. And this is how it should be.
The existence of things cannot be laid down by a certain approach, by some
or other definition. It is open and in relation. The plurality of relations is
matched by a plurality of ways of knowing, each with its own normativity.
And just as each situation has an individual character, because e.g., justice
or love or sickness or money is involved, so knowledge can be typically
characterized by a certain aspect of reality.23 Reality is many-sided and
open, never absolute. The same goes for knowledge. It must comply with
the norms obtaining to it. But absolute knowledge does not exist. Even as
an ideal it is impossible. It would fail to do justice to reality.
(4) The metaphor of seeing tends to connect knowledge with thought
and mind in particular. In this way thinking or knowing and being are
easily set against each other. If mind and thought lose their exclusive
place, then this opposition can no longer be maintained either. If there is a
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plurality of relations and aspects in which the act of knowing takes place,
knowing itself must be situated in reality. Knowing forms part of these
relations. All kinds of aspects are modes of being and modes of experienc
ing. Knowledge opens up reality, not only in the sense that a world can
be opened for those who enter it, but also within this world itself, just as
a flower opens in the light of the sun. This is perhaps most obvious where
knowledge is directly connected with action. For action changes some
thing in the world, it opens or, as the case may be, closes. But the same ap
plies to knowledge that is not directly incorporated in action. Clearly this
knowledge is not extraneous to reality either. Knowledge itself has the
nature of an answer and as such forms an intrinsic part of reality. In this
way it serves to open or, as it may be, close. It only depends on whether
the answering nature of what is known is in fact recognized.
To sum up in one sentence: the visual metaphor tends toward abso
lute knowledge, because rationality is seen as the absolute norm, norm
interpreted as idea, whereas the metaphor of hearing points to intrinsic
normativity which makes knowledge possible and tests it, with great em
phasis on diversity, openness, and relationality, without detracting from
the normative validity.24
IV. The Human Nature o f Knowing
The modern turn to the subject has introduced a new element into the
motif of rationality. Ancient philosophy sees rationality (intelligibility)
mainly as a property of reality itself. In Plato the ideas are not primarily the
ideas of thought. They exist independently, as a reality of their own. And
as such they are known. Descartes's methodological doubt looks for the
starting-point of knowledge in thought itself. The knowing subject now
becomes the intersection for the relation between knowledge and reality.
The rationality of reality is mainly a matter of rational thought itself. It is
methodologically constructed rather than contemplatively discovered.
The new position of the subject is therefore ambiguous. On the one
hand the rationally constructive method is the way in which objective
knowledge can be obtained. This suggests that knowledge is not made
impure by something of the subject, mixed with elements which do not
belong in objective knowledge, like emotions or value judgements. Objec
tive knowledge is only concerned with the 'facts.' On the other hand the
rationally constructive method itself is clearly something of the subject.
For it is the mind which reasons and uses its concepts with a view to real
ity. Hence the recurrent question: what validity do these concepts have in
relation to reality as such?
The traditional position on rationality incorporates the human subject
in the order of reality. There is a tension between rationality and what fails
to meet its criteria, but the human subject as such is not set off against real
ity. On the contrary, human existence shares in the tension within reality.
It self is partly rational, partly sensual and material. This dualism is also
found in Cartesian thought, but there it is connected with another dual
ism, that of inside and outside, of consciousness and reality. As conscious
ness human subjectivity stands opposite reality and the question is how
she can find her way back to it.
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The result of this new conception of the subject is that much more
emphasis is put on human subjectivity, because it is both the startingpoint of methodologically acquired knowledge and the origin of values
and norms. On the other hand reality becomes less human, because only
methodological, preferably mathematical-scientific, value-free knowledge
is supposed to give a reliable representation of objectively given reality.
Section 2 of this contribution already showed how Descartes's position
comes into conflict with the biblical belief in creation. I will now try to give
a more philosophical elaboration of our place in reality. Some elements
from the third section will return in more detail.
4.1 Knowledge within Qualitative Structures
There is a popular notion of knowledge which puts all emphasis on its
projective character. Knowledge starts with a certain expectation, with an
assumption or hypothesis. The next step is to wait and see whether this
hypothesis is correct. Reality is the test which confirms or disproves the
hypothesis. Knowledge acquisition is like a net that is cast out in the hope
of catching something. If the expected catch is found in the net, we have
knowledge.
The projective element is doubtless present in our knowledge. But the
question is whether our knowledge starts with it. In the first place we
can ask whether expectation is not preceded by something. Is the hypoth
esis purely random or is it formulated on the basis of existing data? Isn't
an expectation mostly based on certain experiences? If I expect someone
to be nice, I have probably found her to be nice. A second point is more
fundamental. A design cannot lead to knowledge if there is not already a
connection between the design and what it relates to. A fishing net cannot
catch words or drops of rain. Net and fish share certain physical-spatial
properties, so that the meshes in the net can be geared to the size of the
fish. Only in this way is it possible to catch fish with such a net.
Knowledge as projection is only possible when there is a connection
between the knowing subject and the known object. The suggestion of
the notion of knowledge as projection is that knowledge starts as some
thing in consciousness, is then tested against reality, and is confirmed or
disproved in this way. This is a natural sequel to the Cartesian scheme:
consciousness as starting-point opposite reality. But to take knowledge in
this way is to put it in an impossible position from the outset. Casting a
net only makes sense if it is based on a given correlation. Seeing depends
on visibility. Thinking depends on conceivability. Description in language
depends on something being describable. If these 'passive' properties are
not present in the object of knowledge, the active functions are nothing
but an attempt to catch air or words with a fishing net. So knowledge
presupposes all kinds of coherences.
The various irreducible aspects or modes of being distinguished in Reformational philosophy can be seen as so many relations of coherence. In
principle, according to this theory, all phenomena in reality function in all
aspects, either 'active' as subject or 'passive' as object. Let me explain this
unusual terminology by giving an example.25 A tree has subject functions
or 'active' properties in e.g., the spatial, the physical, and the biotic aspect
and object functions or 'passive' properties in the psychic, the logical, the
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aesthetic, the legal aspect etc. That is to say, a tree itself does not feel and
think, it does not have any experience of beauty and justice. But it can
be felt and logically distinguished. It can also be an object of aesthetic
emotion or of a conflict that is fought out in court. These object functions
are only actualized in relation to subject functions or 'active' properties in
the relevant aspects. The first example involves animals or human beings.
The three others only involve human beings. But this does not mean that
these objective properties are projected onto things. All the cases revolve
around the tree itself. Hence the subject-object relations within an aspect
are relations of coherence, like subject-subject relations.
As relations of coherence subject-subject relations and subject-object
relations are presupposed in all knowledge. The human subject does not
primarily function opposite reality, but within it, and as such is connected
with it by a plurality of aspects. Knowledge therefore does not start with a
projection, but starts from a primary connection. In knowledge this gradu
ally unfolds as acquaintance. Subject-object relations need to be opened
up. This happens when sensory perception develops, when thinking and
speaking are learnt. In short, when reality opens up in experience, in the
development of one human being and in the history of culture.
Unlike the subject-object scheme of Cartesian thought, therefore, this
approach does not primarily place the knowing subject opposite reality,
but incorporates it in reality. Knowing itself, too, takes place within reality
and is not a connection which must bridge the gap between consciousness
and reality. Other differences link up with this. In an alliance with math
ematical-scientific thought, the Cartesian scheme tended towards a view
in which objective reality has no other quality than quantitative determinacy. Objective, measurable facts opposite subjective values and norms. If
a plurality of qualitatively different aspects as correlations can be found
in reality, it is clear that in this respect, too, the Cartesian approach to
reality cannot be maintained. Reality itself is characterized by qualitative
diversity. Knowledge which fails to take this into account is valid at the
very most only if its one-sided character is taken into consideration. The
certainty achieved in this way means that justice cannot be done to the
integral character of reality in a qualitative sense.
The qualitative aspect of reality immediately implies the normative
aspect. This is best illustrated by examples. Someone who enters a room
where a court session is being held will not understand what is happening
if he has no notion of what jurisdiction involves. The qualitatively distinc
tive nature of justice versus beauty, but also versus political power and
economic benefit must be appreciated if someone is to understand what
the judge is doing. The interest of justice may be at odds with the political
advantage or economic benefit of those involved. The judge may include
these aspects of the case in his considerations, but as such they should not
be the deciding factor. The judgement must meet the criteria of the law,
even if this involves political or economic disadvantage for parties. The
quality of the law depends on the application of the law in a normative
sense. This is true in every field.
Another example. Someone who sees marriage as socially recognized
cohabitation in a sexual relationship with certain rights and duties laid
down in law has cut off access to an understanding of the qualitatively
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distinctive nature of marriage. Though the normative dimension of mar
riage is not absent in this formulation, it is interpreted in legal terms. And
this does not tell us what is distinctive about marriage. For the promise
that is made in front of the registrar is not primarily entrance into a legal
contract, but the public confirmation of a mutual promise of faithfulness
in a relationship of which the inner quality is determined by the degree to
which mutual love is present. Someone who enters into a marriage takes
on a normative task. And the quality experienced in marriage depends at
the least to some extent on the degree to which this is taken seriously. The
quality of life is closely bound up with the application of the norms ob
taining to it. In fact this formulation is not yet adequate. The norms are not
added from outside, they form an intrinsic part of life. They themselves
constitute the quality. Hence they can never be totally ignored.
In contrast to what the Cartesian scheme suggests, the qualitative di
versity with implied normativity therefore functions intrinsically in reality
itself. Related to this is the fact that knowing forms an intrinsic part of real
ity. The qualitative diversity is experienced as such. Or also: known. This
is borne out by language. Our speech expresses the entire diversity within
reality. And thus we encounter normativity again. For the way we speak
can open up and close off reality. Someone who talks about sexuality pri
marily in words deriving from obscene language will have great trouble
with its significance in the context of a marital relationship. The view of the
intimate encounter between two people can be blocked by a wrong use of
language. Our being is codetermined by our knowing. And conversely, the
way we exist helps to give direction to the development of our knowledge.
And all aspects of reality function in this. In this way human knowledge
forms part of reality itself, because human functioning with the typical hu
man aspects forms an intrinsic part of reality in its integral existence.
4.2 Knowledge as Human Responsibility
There is another tension in Descartes's argumentation in which he tries
to indicate the foundation for certain knowledge. At first he has enough
in the starting-point 'I think, therefore I am' and the criterion which goes
with it: every step in the methodological argument must have the same
immediate obviousness as the starting-point found. But further on his ac
count identifies another foundation: God. If human knowledge seems to
have an absolute character on the basis of starting-point and method, the
very fact of doubt itself makes it clear to Descartes that human knowledge
is not perfect. This is also shown by the fact that the idea of God which we
have cannot be explained on the basis of humankind itself. That is why
God himself must exist. Next, all knowledge is found to be dependent on
God for its reliability.
For to begin with, that which I have just taken as a rule, that is to say,
that all the things that we very clearly and very distinctly conceive
of are true, is certain only because God is or exists, and that He is a
Perfect Being, and that all that is in us issues from him. From this it
follows that our ideas or notions, which to the extent of their being
clear or distinct are ideas of real things issuing from God, cannot but
to that extent be true.26

KNOWING WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF CREATION

257

If it seems at first that knowledge can be entirely founded in its certainty
on the fact of consciousness and strict method, later everything is sus
tained by Descartes's faith in God. Ultimately the certainty of method
depends on religious trust. The influence of the Christian tradition is un
doubtedly felt here. And because for Descartes truth depends on God, it
will ultimately mean more to him than methodological certainty, which is
significant only because it can be practically used.
In the course of the Modern Age this perspective changes. Knowledge
must be able to stand on its own two feet, separate from any external foun
dation, and certainly independent of any faith. Certainty becomes exclu
sively a matter of subject and method. And the significance of knowledge
is mainly seen to lie in its use. If this use cannot do justice to the signifi
cance, because knowledge also has value as such, the meaning must still
be thought as having its origin in the human subject.
It has become increasingly clear that thought on knowledge has thus
set itself too difficult a task. Absolute certainty has not only proved unat
tainable in practice, even in science, the ideal itself has also come under
criticism, because it does not agree with the human character of knowl
edge. Modern philosophy of science has come up against the same limits
indicated in this essay from the perspective of creation belief. A similar
problem occurs when we try to think the meaning of knowledge as consti
tuted in the knowing subject. The problems caused by the subordination
of all reality to human purposes have become evident in the negative con
sequences entailed in technological control over both nature and society.
If knowledge is not viewed as the means to an end, but as meaningful in
itself, it is not easy to see how human subjectivity could be its origin. The
problem is shown for instance by the fact that in philosophy it is usu
ally not concrete people which are seen as the subject constituting this
meaning. Especially in philosophy it is rather an abstract idea, which is
then called a transcendental subject. More accurately, it is an absolutized
function of concrete human beings, for instance their thought or their con
sciousness. It could also be language.
The absolutization of a certain function as a designation of human sub
jectivity continues a tendency already present in Descartes. After he has
found his indisputable starting-point in 'I think, therefore I am,' he soon
draws the conclusion: 'I am thinking.' This shows that the first proposi
tion, which seems at first sight unproblematic, is open to criticism on
further consideration, because the 'I' is introduced as a matter of course.
When, next, in the second proposition, this 'I' is identified with one of its
functions, namely the function in the first proposition, this self-evidence
proves deceptive. It seems as if the subject of thought, and so of knowl
edge, is thought itself, as the title of an article by Karl Popper strikingly
puts it: 'Epistemology without a knowing subject.'27 As a result, the true
subject, we in our concrete existence, disappears from view.
It is this approach which puts all emphasis on the certainty of knowl
edge. Insofar as the matter of human responsibility is raised in connection
with knowledge itself and not only with its application, it remains con
fined to this. But this fails to address the question whether knowledge also
does justice to reality's distinctive nature. Our integral responsibility for
the qualitative opening up of reality in a normative sense cannot develop
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in this way. The presumption of an absolute position obscures the view
of the real position. The human subject is not constitutive of knowledge
in the sense of providing meaning, but in the sense of being responsible,
of responding to the norms which determine the specifically structured
cognitive situation.
It is clear from the above how much the view of knowledge held by
people implies a view of themselves. As a natural sequel to the Cartesian
method, humans are understood either from one or more of their functions—this is the sense in which we interpreted Descartes's statements
above—or as the elusive subject which precedes them all: all functions can
be objectified and analyzed, but the subject which carries out these acts re
mains invisible for that very reason, just as the eye that sees objects cannot
see itself at the same time. In both cases it is difficult to call humankind to
account. If the person is approached from the viewpoint of some or other
function, the nature of this function will be seen to determine her knowl
edge. In that case it is the actual structures which determine the nature
and scope of knowledge. These can be analyzed, but are not connected
with responsibility. If the person is seen as a transcendental subject, which
needs to be assumed in order to understand knowledge, any talk about
responsibility is inappropriate too.
The perspective becomes very different when we reorientate ourselves
to the biblical belief in creation. The human self as subject can then no lon
ger be seen as withdrawn from structures nor as coinciding with them. She
exists in these structures. Or rather, the structures enable her to exist. If we
interpret existence once more as response, structures can be described as
response structures. Typical human structures like thought, language, law
etc. are response structures in a double sense. As creatures we respond to
the promise-command to be on the basis of the structures by which we
exist. As human beings we can be said to answer in responsibility for the
structures in which we exist give us this possibility of responsibility.
But precisely when we speak about response and responsibility, it be
comes clear that we as human beings are not absorbed in the structures.
We are addressed as this unique human being. As such we must respond,
also when we do this communally with others. The biblical belief in cre
ation means we as human beings are addressed by God, uniquely and
together with others. This should determine our self-understanding. On
this basis the structures of our existence receive their deep meaning as re
sponse structures. The creational relationship contains the ultimate foun
dation of our responsibility. Our knowledge of reality forms the horizon
within which we bear responsibility. But because in acquiring knowledge,
too, we make choices and choose directions, knowledge itself is part of
our responsibility. Its basic structures are given with the creation itself.
From the creation they derive their qualitative nature and their normative
determination. But how we exist in these structures and unfold them is
our responsibility. That is why, in our knowing, we can open up and close
off reality.
VU University, Amsterdam
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NOTES
1. This essay is a revised version of chapter 12 'Kennis in reformatorisch
wijsgerig perspectief' in Cultuurfilosofie. Katholieke, reformatorische, humanistische, islamitische en joodse reflecties over onze cultuur (Philosophy of culture.
Catholic, Reformational, Humanist, Islamic and Jewish reflections on our cul
ture), ed. Edith Brugmans (Open Universiteit Nederland, 2002), pp. 419-54.
Translated from the Dutch by A. P. Runia.
2. See Herman Dooyeweerd, A New Critique o f Theoretical Thought. Vol
ume 1: The necessary presuppositions of philosophy; Volume 2: The gen
eral theory of the modal spheres; Volume 3: The structures of individuality
of temporal reality; Volume 4: Index of subjects and authors. Original edi
tion—Amsterdam/Paris/Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publish
ing Company, 1953-1958. Reprint—Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1997.
A similar approach can be found in Hendrik Hart, Understanding Our World.
An integral Ontology (Lanham: University Press of America, 1984); and Roy A.
Clouser, The Myth o f Religious Neutrality o f Science. An Essay on the Hidden Role
o f Religious Belief in Theories (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2d
revised edition, 2005, 1991).
3. Actually he says that biblical faith cannot ask the question 'Why is
there something and not nothing?' because the question makes no sense for
faith. Cf. M. Heidegger, Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1953), p. 5f. (Translated as Introduction to Metaphysics by Gregory
Fried and Richard Polt, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).
4. Ps. 139:1, 6. Revised Standard Version (1952). All further references are
to this translation.
5. Gen. 1:6, 16, 25, 26.
6. Gen. 1:3, 6, 7, 9, 14, 15, 20.
7. Cf. Claus Westermann, Genesis, Biblischer Kommentar Altes Testament.
Teilband I Genesis 1-11 (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1974), p.
117f. (Translated as Genesis 1-11: A Continental Commentary, Minneapolis: For
tress Press, 1994).
8. Ps. 33:9.
9. The significance of Jesus Christ for the Christian faith has everything to
do with the fulfilment of the promise given with creation.
10. Gen. 1:26-27.
11. Matt. 22:37-40.
12. Plato, Republic, vii 516b-c. Translation F. M. Cornford.
13. Plato follows the Greek philosopher Parmenides in this.
14. Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and
G. R. T. Ross, in The Philosophical Works o f Descartes vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cam
bridge University Press, 1911). Reprinted in Discourse on the Method and Medi
tations on First Philosophy / Rene Descartes, ed. David Weissman (New Haven
and London: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 21.
15. Op. cit., p. 21.
16. Op. cit., p. 10.
17. Cf. Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere (Oxford University Press
1986), 69f.
18. For a discussion about knowledge as correspondence with reality, see
Henk G. Geertsema, 'Dooyeweerd on knowledge and truth.' In Ways o f Know
ing in Concert, ed. John H. Kok (Sioux Center: Dordt College Press, 2005), pp.
85-100.
19. It is important to bear in mind, for what follows, that 'command' and
the related concept 'hearing' should be understood against the background of
the creative word as a word that 'calls into existence,' as discussed in section
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2.1.2. Though this 'command' implies authority, it primarily involves making
possible, calling into being. Because of its inner quality, this implies a prom
ise. Hence 'promise-command-to-be.' That the relation is not one of external
compulsion is also made clear by the command's appeal to responsibility in
the case of humans.
20. Gadamer makes an interesting point in this connection. He draws at
tention to the special relation between the general and the particular which
emerges from Aristotle's ethics. Practical cognition cannot be accommodated
in Plato's abstract model. Application to the concrete situation is an essen
tial component of ethical insight. See H.-G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode.
Grundzuge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik (Tubingen: Ges. Werke, Bd. I, J. C.
B. Mohr, 1990), pp. 317ff. Translated as Truth and Method. 2d revised ed. by Joel
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22. Cf. e.g., Roy A. Clouser, The Myth o f Religious Neutrality. An Essay on
the Hidden Role o f Religious Belief in Theories, 2nd edition (University of Notre
Dame Press 2005).
23. In a concrete situation tensions may arise between different kinds of
knowledge as between faith and science. This certainly will happen if either
or both are made absolute or closed off from other approaches. The reason can
also be the complexity of the situation.
24. From a very different background the visual metaphor has been criti
cized as a starting-point for the conception of knowledge by, among others,
R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror o f Nature (Oxford: Basil Blackwell/Princeton
University Press, 1980).
25. The reader should realize that subject and object functions as active
and passive properties are primarily ontological not epistemological catego
ries. They have also epistemic meaning because of the close connection be
tween epistemology and ontology that I argue for later in the text.
26. Op. cit., pp. 24-25.
27. In Karl Popper, Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach (Oxford:
At The Clarendon Press), pp. 146-52.

